Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist.
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The dynamics of signalling in contests has received considerable attention in the last two decades. In contests, communication is complicated by the fact that animals may often benefit from deceiving their opponents about their fighting ability or motivation to escalate. If deception is beneficial, then signallers will often lie. If signallers frequently convey unreliable information, then recipients will stop attending to their signals, and communication will become meaningless (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Maynard Smith 1982) . Zahavi (1975) was the first to resolve this paradox by suggesting that the reliability of signals will be maintained by their cost. Signals given during contests will be evolutionarily stable only if the costs or negative consequences associated with lying are greater than the benefits that would be obtained from giving false signals. Signals that are costly to produce or risky to give are incorruptible because it would not be possible or profitable for low-quality or poorly motivated individuals to produce them (Zahavi 1977 (Zahavi , 1993 Enquist 1985; Grafen 1990; Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons 1995) . The roars of red deer, Cervus elaphus (Clutton-Brock & Albon 1979), stotting by Thompson's gazelles, Gazella thomsonii (Fitzgibbon & Fanshawe 1988) , and musth in male African elephants, Loxodonta africana (Poole 1987 (Poole , 1989 , provide examples of costly signals. A similar logic applies to communication in some other situations such as courtship and resource transfers between parents and offspring.
However, not all honest signals need be costly (Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Maynard Smith 1991 , 1994 . When signallers gain nothing by deceiving their partners, lowcost signals ('cheap talk') can evolve. Maynard Smith (1991, 1994) explored the dynamics of low-cost signalling when there is no conflict of interest between participants. He devised the Philip Sidney game, in which a potential donor (Sir Philip Sydney) is paired with a potential beneficiary (a soldier) on a battlefield. The donor has a resource (water bottle) which can be given to the beneficiary. The donor suffers some decrement to his own fitness if he gives up the water bottle, and the beneficiary benefits from receiving the water bottle, particularly if he is thirsty. Maynard Smith demonstrated that if the donor and beneficiary have some stake in each other's survival, because they are kin or share a common interest in the outcome of the battle, then cost-free signals of the beneficiary's need for the resource can evolve (Maynard Smith 1991). Moreover, evolution may also favour the evolution of cost-free signals of the donor's willingness to give the resource under certain conditions (Maynard Smith 1994) .
Although Maynard Smith's results demonstrated that low-cost signals can evolve if there is no conflict of interest between participants, Zahavi (1993) has argued that 'It is difficult to imagine any social interaction in which there is no potential for conflict at some time or another'. If Zahavi's intuition is correct, then Maynard Smith's results are largely irrelvant to the evolution of animal signals. However, in Maynard Smith's model, low-cost signals can evolve when both players rank outcomes in the same order, even though they may differ in the extent to which they value these outcomes.
The circling displays of male blue-headed wrasses, Thalasomma bifasciatum, seem to fit the parameters of
